This study examines the impact of major health insurance reform on payments made in the health care sector. We study the prices of services paid to physicians in the privately insured market during the Massachusetts health care reform. The reform increased the number of insured individuals as well as introduced an online marketplace where insurers compete. We estimate that, over the reform period, physician payments increased at least 10.8 percentage points relative to control areas.
Introduction
The primary goals of the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform were to expand the number of individuals with health insurance coverage and increase the degree of competition in the insurance marketplace. The expansion focused on using financial incentives to spur enrollment in the private insurance market. The key elements of the legislation included an individual insurance mandate, employer requirements to provide insurance, the creation of a subsidized insurance program to low-income individuals, and the intro- ) and the place of service (i.e., emergency room or physician office) (Miller [2012a] ). The finding that the reform affected service utilization is in line with a vast empirical literature that documents the effect of insurance coverage on utilization (e.g., Manning et al. [1987] , Finkelstein [2007] , and Finkelstein et al. [2012] ). However, distinct from prior expansions in public insurance, where prices are fixed by regulators (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid), both the ACA and the reforms in Massachusetts rely more heavily on the private sector. Consequently, these reforms may not only affect utilization, but may also have an impact on equilibrium prices, including insurance premiums and payments to health care providers.
This paper focuses specifically on the effect of insurance expansion on payments to providers. Since health care accounts for about 18 percent of nominal GDP, even a relatively small price increase to providers would increase the nominal expenditures devoted to the health sector and also affect national measures of inflation and output. Prices are also important signals that affect the long-run market entry decisions and also short-run decisions on the quantity and types of services offered to patients. 2 Theoretically, the 1 Survey evidence from Krueger and Kuziemko [2013] suggest that 35 million uninsured individuals would gain insurance. 2 Clemens and Gottlieb [2013] find supply motives associated with physician payment increases, indi-mechanisms by which the reform might impact provider fees are straightforward. First, the reform led more than 400,000 previously uninsured individuals to obtain health insurance, causing a substantial increase in the demand for health care (Kolstad and Kowalski [2012] , Miller [2012b] , and Long, Stockley, Dahlen [2012] ). To match demand, insurers may need to adjust physician payments in order to maintain their current physician network or to draw new physicians into their network. Second, the new health insurance exchange, known as the Massachusetts Connector, likely increased the degree of competition among insurers (Ericson and Starc [2012] ). Dunn and Shapiro [2013] and Dafny et al [2012] show that a higher degree of competition in the insurance market raises payments to physicians.
While theory would suggest that expansion would likely lead to higher prices, the magnitude and timing of the effect is unclear. For instance, there is the possibility that physician capacity was sufficient to accommodate expansion at existing rates. Ultimately, the effect of the reform on prices must be measured empirically.
In this study, we focus on the impact of the Massachusetts reform on payments to
physicians. There are two reasons for focusing on physician prices. First, relative to how other payments are set in the healthcare industry, physician payment contracts are usually quite simple. Prices are based on fees for a specific procedures defined by Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. For example, there are distinct CPT codes for office visits that last 15 minutes and those that last 30 minutes. 3 This is in contrast to how prices are negotiated for inpatient hospital services where the definition of a service is more complex and the pricing methodology may change dramatically depending on the specific contract between each insurer and provider (see Reinhardt [2006] ). 4 A second reason for focusing on physician prices is that the number of physicians is quite large reducing the chance that the price changes are caused by a single provider's negotiating practices.
Prior studies measuring the impact of Massachusetts reform have relied on two different sources of variation to conduct difference-in-difference analysis: across-state variation and across-county variation. We apply both approaches, obtaining two distinct estimates of the effect on physician prices. Specifically, one approach uses across-state variation to identify the relative change in Massachusetts prices around the time of the reform, relative to cating the payments may also affect the quantity and types of services provided to patients. 3 Due to the thousands of CPT codes in existence, physicians usually negotiate the prices of all CPT codes at once based on a fee schedule-for example, all prices set relative to Medicare prices (see Clemens and Gottlieb [2014] ). 4 For example, inpatient hospital contracts may be based on a discount off of charges, a per diem rate, or price based on the diagnosis code (i.e., DRG code) of the patient.
comparable states, as applied in Kolstad and Kowalski [2012] . To obtain comparable control states, we apply the synthetic control approach of Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
[2010]. 5 The second approach exploits variation in the pre-reform uninsured rates in the county, as applied by Miller [2012a] . 6 This analysis adds another layer of variation-the uninsured rate of the county-under the presumption that providers and insurers residing in those counties with higher uninsured rates should have anticipated a higher impact of the reform on insurance coverage than those counties with already near-full coverage.
Unlike prior studies of the reform, our analysis assesses the timing of the impact of the reform. In examining price impacts of the reform, tracking the timing is important since key industry characteristics suggest that a response to the reform should be expected prior to implementation. First, price negotiations between physician firms and insurers take place rather sporadically-anywhere from annually to every five years. Since prices are essentially "stuck" for a fixed duration of time, it is likely that insurers set prices based on expectations of future demand and competition over the contract period. Both our across-state and across-county analysis lead to a similar conclusion. Relative to control states and counties, we find that prices are significantly higher post-reform, relative to the pre-reform period. Overall, our estimates imply that at least one-sixth of overall physician service price growth in Massachusetts was directly attributable to the reform itself. The timing of the price increase occurs around the time the health care legislation passed the house and senate-the period in which their was a high probability 5 Our state-level analysis is based on a variation of the classical Fisher permutation test-similar to a recent paper by Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valletta [2012] . Similar results are found using alternative difference-in-difference approaches at the state level. 6 This approach is also applied in Finkelstein [2007] looking at the effects from the introduction of Medicare. 7 The first major components of the legislation aimed at people with lower incomes went into effect in It is important to highlight a few caveats of this study. First, this study assesses the impact of the reform on payments made to physicians from insurers, not the impact of the reform on insurance premiums or out-of-pocket costs that are charged to employers and enrollees. Given the reform induced expansion in the private insurance market, ultimately changing the competitive landscape, it is possible that no medical-care price increases were passed onto consumers. 10 In fact, Graves and Gruber [2012] find that the reforms had no effect on group premiums in Massachusetts relative to other states, and led to a reduction in premiums in the non-group market. Second, our study assess the prices of services provided by physicians in an office setting. We make no definitive assessment about pharmaceutical prices or payments made to hospitals in an inpatient setting. Third, we analyze the prices of physicians services in the privately insured market. Our data does not include Medicare or Medicaid prices or prices charged to the uninsured. Furthermore, we likely do not see prices paid by plans in the subsidized insurance exchange. The overall impact of the reform would be partly offset if subsidized plans pay physicians less generously than other plans, or previously uninsured patients pay lower prices after the reform. Finally, the results in this study should not be treated as a normative statement regarding the merits of the reform. To fully evaluate the success of a reform, policymakers must weigh the potential benefits of the reform, such as expanded coverage, improved health outcomes, and a more competitive insurance market, against the associated cost.
9 Kwoka and Shumilkina [2010] show that prices fall in airline markets when potential competitors are eliminated after a merger. Anticipatory effects are not confined to prices. For instance, Goetz and Shapiro
[2012] find that airlines preemptively codeshare when a route is threatened, while Ellison and Ellison [2011] find that pharmaceutical firms make strategic investments to deter future entry. It is interesting to note that forward-looking price setting models have been commonplace in the macroeconomics literature for some time (e.g. see Gali and Gertler [1999] 
Impact of the Reform
Estimates vary on the exact effect of the reform on coverage, although the consensus The increase in the demand for services does not appear to have led to movements of physicians into the Massachusetts market. In Table 1 we report the number and geographic movement of doctors in the United States from the SK&A database. The database spans
2005 to 2008 and includes information on the name, location, and specialty of physicians (see Dunn and Shapiro [2013] for more information about the SK&A database).
18 Table 1 provides counts for those physicians who were in the database all four years, which allows us to measure the geographic movement of physicians who practiced in Massachusetts before the reform took place. 19 The numbers show that there was little movement of physicians into or out of Massachusetts during the reform. 20 We also consulted with Partners Healthcare, a large health system in Massachusetts, who informed us that although provider consolidation has increased in recent years, there was not a lot of consolidation occurring around the reform period. Overall, health-care expenditures and premiums grew during the 2000s in Massachusetts.
The DHCFP reports that private spending per member grew 15.5 percent between 2006 the reform and then eventually improved. 18 As noted in our previous work, this data is very noisy concerning consolidation in a time-series dimension. However, it is comprehensive in terms of individual physician counts. 19 This also allows us to control for the fact that the size of the SK&A sample grew over their sample period. 20 We also observe relatively little movement in the share of doctors across states when looking at county data from the American Medical Association. 
Physician Service Prices and the Reform
Prices for physician services in private insurance markets are set through negotiations between insurers and physician groups. Both sides may gain from contracting and agreeing on rates before marketing insurance plans. Those physicians who agree to a contract are placed in-network, where enrollees may visit a physician at a lower out-of-pocket cost than out-of-network physicians. Physicians gain access to enrollees in the insurer's plan, while the insurer is more likely to attract enrollees if the network contains a broad, high-quality physician network. Each side may attempt to gain leverage and more favorable rates by threatening to not contract with the other party. Contract durations vary by the health care provider and the insurance firm. For instance, contracts between large health systems and commercial payers are typically negotiated every three years, sometimes up to every five years, whereas contracts between smaller practices and insurers are typically set on an auto-renewing annual basis with provisions that allow either party to terminate the contract.
There are at least two reasons why service prices could be affected by the Massachusetts reform. The first reason is related to insurance demand. The individual and employer mandate increased the number of insured by over 400,000 individuals. To match the increased demand, an insurer may be enticed to draw new physicians into its network with higher fees. This effect could potentially be larger in areas with a high number of uninsured individuals.
The second reason is related to the competitive environment in the insurance market.
All else equal, more competition between insurers acts to raise physician payments (Dunn and Shapiro [2013] It is important keep in mind the possibility that the reform had no effect on service prices. In particular, physicians may have sufficient capacity or may be able to adjust practice patterns, allowing them to see more patients at pre-reform rates. The ambiguity of the theoretical prediction elevates the importance of testing the effect empirically.
MarketScan Data
The MarketScan database used in this analysis tracks insurance claims from physicians using a nationwide convenience sample of patients. show that data are actually quite representative of actual health-care spending.
Each observation in the data corresponds to a service line item in an "explanation of benefits" form. We use MarketScan's payment variable, which is defined as the total gross payment to a provider for a specific service. MarketScan also indicates the type of insurance plan the claim was made under, which allows us to ignore episodes in which a capitation payment was made. 26 The bottom portion of Table 2 compares the types of spending in Massachusetts to the entire United States and New England. 27 An apparent disparity in Massachusetts is its low share of PPO spending and high share of HMO spending. We verified this with HealthLeaders-InterStudy (HLIS), which shows similar HMO market shares and verifies that this is likely representative.
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Nevertheless, speaking with insurance companies in Massachusetts leads us to believe that the distinction between plan types has blurred over the past couple of decades. That is, there are many HMO plans with low restrictions and PPO plans with high restrictions.
The cutoff in the distinction between these types of plans likely varies regionally.
4 State-Level Analysis period we simply refer to as the pre-and post-reform periods.
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As noted by Moulton [1990] , statistical inference is not straightforward in this setting. 
where j indicates a CPT code-physician ID-plan triple, and c indicates a county. 30 Growth rates can then be calculated from the γ t estimates. 31 We can then treat the other 50 estimates of price growth as the sampling distribution for general price growth over any two periods of time t 1 and t 2 . Accordingly, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that Massachusetts price growth during a specific period of time is no different than that any other state can be obtained by computing the percentile that it falls in the entire distribution.
Since there are 50 "placebo" estimates, if Massachusetts is ranked second from the top or bottom of the distribution, we can infer that its price growth is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Statistical significance at the 5 percent level requires it be ranked first.
Each panel in Figure 1 consists of a histogram of price-growth rates of the 51 states.
Note that our regression estimate γ t measures price growth for each state relative to the national average-for instance, a price growth rate of 5 percent means that prices grew 5 29 We conduct a more sensitive test of the specific timing of the reform when we conduct the across-county analysis. 30 The regressions are weighted by the average price of the CPT code over the entire sample-as would be done in a Tornqvist index. This gives less weight to lower value services. 31 For example, the cumulative growth between 2003q1 and 2010q4 is exp(γ 2010q4 ) − 1.
percentage points faster than the U.S. average. 32 The top-left panel depicts the cumulative growth rate between 2003q1 and 2010q4. The other three panels report annualized growth rates during the three specific time periods outlined above. To do so requires using a set of predictor variables. Our predictor variables are the percent of the population over age 65, the uninsured rate, median household income, median house value, median rent, percent of population with a college degree, population density, the unemployment rate, percent of spending that is HMO (from MarketScan), percent of spending that is PPO (from MarketScan), the number of university hospitals per capita, and the pre-reform estimates of γ t . 35 Means of these predictor variables and state weights for Massachusetts are available in the appendix. The synthetic control for Massachusetts was determined to be a convex combination of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Illinois and Alaska. Results were generally robust to a range of predictor variables.
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Our empirical exercise is performed as follows. For each quarter, t, we construct a measure of the gap between the synthetic control price level and the actual price level: The results in the section are consistent with a story where services prices were negotiated up in anticipation of health care reform. Indeed, during the lead-up period there was extensive news coverage and political speeches about the reform. As price negotiations are based on lengthy contracts, anywhere from one to five years in length, insurers were likely taking this into account when setting fee schedules.
As with any reduced-form analysis, there are some drawbacks to this analysis. Notably, identification of the difference-in-differences estimator at the state level rests mainly on a comparison in growth rates between time periods. To strengthen our identification in this regard, we next exploit variation within Massachusetts at the county level. Specifically, we run a triple difference-in-differences estimator by exploiting the fact that the reform should have had a stronger impact in those counties with higher rates of uninsured.
County-Level Analysis
In our county-level analysis, we estimate whether the impact of the Massachusetts insurance reform was caused by the increase, or expected increase, in insurance coverage the reform would generate. To do so, we implement an identification technique similar to Finkelstein [2007] and Miller [2012] . Both Finkelstein and Miller exploited the fact that certain geographic areas should, ex ante, be more affected by policy reform than others based on their pre-reform insurance coverage rates. In the setting of the Massachusetts reform, counties in Massachusetts with low rates of insurance coverage have the most coverage to gain by an insurance mandate. Health care providers and insurers located in low insurance coverage counties should therefore expect to be impacted more by the health insurance reform than those counties that already had high insurance coverage.
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For instance, individuals who use the Connector are more apt to live in counties with high uninsured rates. Table 3 shows insurance coverage statistics for the non-elderly, taken from the U.S.
Census Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) for the largest nine counties 37 Dunn and Shapiro [2013] show that the physician market may be as small as a 20-minute driving radius. 
County-Level Empirical Analysis
We run a triple difference-in-differences estimation by interacting 38 To keep the table smaller we do not depict statistics for Dukes, Nantucket, Franklin, Hampshire, and Barnstable counties which together represent 7 percent of Massachusetts's population. All counties were used in our estimation.
where n represents the patient receiving treatment, c represents the provider's county, and j represents three characteristics of the service-CPT code plus modifier (k), provider ID(i), and health insurance type (l). It follows that P jnct is the price of service j paid to a provider who resides in county c and consumed by patient n in year-quarter t. Including service fixed effects, 1(Service jc ), isolates variation over time in the payment to a specific provider, procedure and type of plan (that is, HMO, PPO, POS, etc.). We include the county, c, Table 3 for Massachusetts. We weight observations in the regression by a proxy for the service's relative value units (RVUs).
Our proxy is the average price of the CPT code over the entire U.S. sample-the same as that used in Dunn, Shapiro, and Liebman [2012] . We show that our main result does not depend on weighting. Standard errors are clustered by county to account for spatial correlation between counties and time-series correlation in the error terms. 
Measuring the Implied Impact of the Reform
To estimate the timing and size of the level shift in λ t , we estimate a series of regressions that take the following form:
This specification replaces the flexibly estimated coefficients of λ t with the post-period coefficient λ t * . Specifically, λ t * can be interpreted as the impact of an expected 0.50 to 0.75 percentage point increase in insurance coverage on the log price level in the post-period, defined as t ≥ t * , relative to the pre-period, defined as t < t * . Note that if the estimate λ t * is statistically significantly different than zero, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no break in the level of λ t in period t * . We investigated the robustness of this result by repeating this exercise under a number of alternative specifications. Table 4 shows the estimates and p-values of λ t * under our main specification (the first two columns) as well as four alternatives. To address concern that our provider ID threshold (being in the sample at least six years) is either too strict or too narrow, we ran a specification where the provider ID is in the sample all eight years of the sample and another specification where there is no restriction. Another concern is We can use the estimate of λ t * =2006q1 to measure the effect of an expected increase in is directly attributable to the expected insurance increase of the reform.
Conclusion
Our study confirms that there was likely a reaction in physician prices in anticipation of health insurance reform in Massachusetts. Service prices rose by at least 10.8 percent, mainly in the period after the reform passed the House and Senate separately. This is consistent with insurers and physicians negotiating prices in a forward-looking manner, in anticipation of the implementation of the reform.
This study does not explicitly identify the mechanism by which prices were raised.
That is, it is not clear whether demand or competitive concerns caused prices to rise in anticipation of the reform. However, the available data from the DHCFP suggest that competitive concerns in the insurance market may have played an important role. The DHCFP reports that premiums grew less rapidly than expenditures, while the medical loss ratio increased. In addition, despite our finding of a price increase, Graves and Gruber [2012] find that the reforms had no effect on group premiums in Massachusetts, and even led to lower permiums in the nongroup market, relative to other states. This evidence suggests that service price increases were not passed on to consumers, which is consistent with a more competitive insurance market post-reform. Furthermore, our conversations with Massachusetts health care providers and insurers leads us to believe that there was at least a perceived increase in the degree of competition in the insurance market stemming from the exchange.
In terms of implications for the ACA, our results imply that there may be price effects and they could occur before implementation. A major caveat, however, is that there are While this study highlights an important consequence of the reform in Massachusetts, the results should not be treated as a normative statement regarding the merits of the reform. To fully evaluate the success of a reform, policymakers must weigh the benefits of the reform, such as expanded coverage and additional competition in the insurance market, against the associated cost. The analysis presented in this paper provides information with regards to medical-care prices, allowing for more accurately shaped policies in this regard. 
B Robustness: Estimates of λ t
We perform a few robustness exercises. First, we estimate our model on the sample of Northeast states, which includes the sample of New England states plus New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. This sample includes 37,493,340 observations. Second, we include trends specific to the 2005 uninsured rate in the county (i.e. trend · Uninsured2005 c ) as well as specific to Massachusetts (i.e. trend · Uninsured2005 c · 1(MA). We perform two specifications that include this type of trend. One specification estimates this trend using the entire sample period, the other specification estimates the trend on the pre-reform period. 
